When it took power in July 1979, the Sandinista government of Nicaragua did not have any well-developed theory of Marxist democracy on which to draw. Nor did it have fully democratic Marxist models on which to base its praxis or on which it could rely for support, sustenance, and encouragement to develop its own democratic Marxism. There were few real-world examples and little support from actual nation states to develop a democratic form of socialism, and even fewer to do so within the specific historic conditions in Nicaragua. ' The absence of these factors made the construction of such a democratic socialism difficult. It also retarded the development of sufficient confidence to sustain truly unique democratic institutions in the face of increasing external pressure from the United States and decreasing support from the Eastern European countries.
Both the United States and the Soviet Union thought their respective model was the best for the Nicaraguans. Even though the Soviets were more subtle, both superpowers were to some degree uncomfortable with a uniquely Nicaraguan road to development and democracy that would break radically from the Eastern and Western models. Ironically, each side believed that developments in Nicaragua were wholly inadequate and indicative of either dominance by Western influences (from the perspective of the socialist East) or communism (from the perspective of the capitalist West). The socialist states were, however, clearly more willing to support Nicaragua because the ideology was nominally Marxist (even 1 ____________ .... h though the economic and political systems were very different from thos,e in Eastern Europe). The socialist states also realized that Nicaragua s newly found independent, nonaligned stance threatened the tradltlOn~1 hegemony that the United States had exercised m the Canbbean Basin, The popular insurrection that swept the Sandinistas to power lD 1979 initially endowed the emerging political system with a strong participatory dimension. It did not, however, coincide well with either Western representative democracy or Eastern bureaucratic socialism, since both of these systems had either diminished or never adequately evolved mechanisms to insure or facilitate direct, ongoing participation by the people.
The Marxist tradition is more diverse than the now-failed socialist states in Eastern Europe would suggest. As with Jeffersonian democracy, theoretical Marxism allows for real or direct democracy as well as nonparticipatory forms of governance that claim to be participatory. The first relies more heavily on innovative theoretical interpretations, while the second is based on Leninist conceptualizations of the party and actual socialist practice.
Before Stalinism poisoned the international socialist movement, Marxism was not a fixed dogma; it was a means of understanding events and a theoretical guide for developing all aspects of socialism.' Among these were ways of assuring that democracy developed under socialism (see Megill 1970, p. 54). In his now widely quoted essay, "What is Orthodox Marxism?" (originally published in the early 1920s), Georg Lukacs (1971,p. 1) argues that Marxism "does not imply the uncritical acceptance of the results of Marx's investigations. It is not the 'belief in this or that thesis,not the exegesisofa 'sacred' book. On the contrary, orthodox refers exclusively to method. "
Thus Marxism can and should be developed in light of new and different conditions. The Russian Marxist dissident Roy Medvedev (1975, p. xx) argues that "Marxism, in my view, is not some kind of dogma but a science that should be developed and enriched by new ideas and theories, while propositions that prove to be obsolete, one-sided, or even wrong must be discarded." And as to democracy, he is even more specific: "It is absolutely not true that Marxism and socialism are incompatible with democracy." He does note that "the works of neither Marx and Engels nor Lenin adequately deal with the complex problems involved [with democracy]" (ibid.), and calls for the development of democratic Marxist theory to fill tr:'isgap. Lamentably, this task has not yet been accomplished.
As Marxists like Lukacs strove to assert their independence and develop democrati~th~ory and practice in Hungary in 1956 (Lukacs was rmmster of education lD the short-lived Nagy government and was impnsone~a~d exiled for his involvement), they were brutally crushed by the Soviet Juggernaut that had been fashioned by Joseph Stalin. Even more to the point, the vibrant, experimental, and very democratic Marxism(socialism with a human face) that was led by Alexander Dubcek in the Prague Spring of 1968 was also crushed by Soviet tanks before any of the theoretical or practical problems of democratizing Marxism could be resolved.A similar fate seems to have met many others who attempted to democratizeMarxist theory or practice. For instance, when Rudolf Bahro (1978, esp. part 3) wrote his now famous work Die Alternative in 1<n7 and calledfor an emancipatory alternative to the bureaucratic socialism that had developed in Eastern Europe, he was first forced from the party in the German Democratic Republic and then forced into exile. The generally negative reception that such calls for a democratic, participatory alternative in Eastern Europe received made it difficult for creative Marxistthinkers everywhere and further retarded the development of democraticMarxist theory.
Noform of democracy has been easy to achieve in the Latin American context.Although most Latin American nations have been republics for some170years (Brazil was an empire until 1889 and Cuba did not gain its independence until 1902), few have been able to achieve any consistent democracyand many have been influenced as much by outside forces as bythe willof their own people. Nicaragua, for instance, experienced long periodsof dictatorial rule, the frequent intervention of the Marines, and theseizureof power in the 1850sby a Yankee mercenary, William Walker, who declared himself president and designated English as the official language.Like most of Latin America, its history, institutions, and political culture were heavily imbued with authoritarianism and often influencedby some of the least democratic aspects of its large neighbor to the North.
If the first, nineteenth-century (bourgeois democratic) revolutions didnot firmly root nominal Western democracy in all of Latin America, many hoped that the second (socialist) revolutions would break the authoritarian tradition and interject vibrant forms of people's democracy intothe political milieu. Indeed, Fidel Castro and CM Guevara dreamt of a continental revolution that would forge free and independent socialist republicsin which the people could rule their destinies. But their dream has been difficult to realize. First, other socialist revolutions were not inunediately triumphant. Second, as Cuba gained more autonomy and freedom as an independent nation, the constant economic and political pressurefrom the United States combined with other factors to prevent it fromtranscending its authoritarian political culture or setting aside the antidemocratic influences from Eastern Europe. Cuba did not begin to holdelections or provide other forms of democratic participation for more than a decade after the revolutionary triumph. Reforms in the mid-1970s did, however, institutionalize regularized local elections and initiate a
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Democracy & Socialism in Sandinista Nicaragua series of new structures and procedures (popular power in particular) that facilitated greater participation and decisionmaking power for the Cuban masses, though mostly at the lower level (see Harnecker 1980) . These reforms and the participation they engendered represent~d a ne,,: and different attempt to keep alive the democratic Ideal ill Latin America-sthis time in a state that was well along the path of socialist construction. Michael Lowy (1986, p. 270) observed that "popular power in Cuba represents a real democratic advance in the transitron to socialism and an example that should be carefully studied." But like its Eastern European counterparts, Cuba was still struggling with authoritarian and bureaucratic party rule. Nor did the constant pressure from the United States diminish the perceived need for an authoritarian state. The popular power movement did interject an element of democracy at the local level. Decisionmaking at the national level, however, was still far removed from direct control by the people. No national leaders were elected directly by the people or by their mass organizations.
This reality and the growing bureaucratization of Cuban society led many to wonder if the construction of socialist states in Latin America would actually enhance the practice of democracy. The triumph of progressive forces in Chile in 1970suggested that even more traditional forms of Western-style democracy might allow some Latin American nations with more firmly established democratic political cultures and institutions to use these to construct socialism and stimulate even greater participation by the popular masses. The flowering of democracy and socialism during the Allende years proved inspirational for many Latin Americans. In the eyes of many, Chile even began to serve as a model of democratic socialism in Latin America. However, the bloody 1973 coup and the Pinochet dictatorship that followed suggested that Western democracy and socialism might not be compatible at all and that more authoritarian measures might be necessary to ensure the continuation of socialism and even the possibility of more expansive democracy at a later time.
The triumph of the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua in July 1979 estab.li~hed a state .that valued its freedom and independence highly. The Sandinista revolution was clearly under the hegemony of a Marxist vanguard. party, but it was also dedicated to the democratic incorporation of the NIcaraguan people and-because ofthe broad-based multiclass composition of the coalition of forces that toppled Anastasio Somoza-to democ~atic pluralism. Although buffeted by the residual effects of the revolution agamst Somoza and the increasing hostility of the United States after 1981, there was (in varying degrees) a commitment to building both democracy and socialism in the new state.
e case of Nicaragua thus posed an important question: can a Latin Amencan--or Third World-nation, struggling to achieve a larger degree In talking with Pavletich about Mariategui, Borge was utilizing one of the few sources of authentic Latin Marxism and symbolically laying the groundwork for the development of a non-Stalirrist Marxism in Nicaragua. Indeed, Borge's view of Mariategui (who was eventually condemned by the Sovietsin the 1930s) was that "he was the most important Marxist that Latin America produced." Conversely, he was openly critical of other Latin American Marxists who had dogmatically followed the Soviet line." The Sandinistas hoped to break with the old authoritarian Marxism that had dominated the movement in and outside of Latin America. To do so they realized that they must infuse their ideology and politics with a strong dose of popular democracy. However, it was not always easy to decide just which forms of democracy were optimal or applicable.
Capitalist and Socialist Conceptions of Democracy
"Democracy" derives from demos, the people, and kratos, the exercise of power. In its original sense it means power of the people (Medvedev 1975 p. 31). American academic Samuel Huntington (1989, p. 12) suggests tha; "democracy~an be defined in terms of who rules, for what ends and by what means. In Its most radical sense, It IS, as Abraham Lincoln said, a government of the people, and by the people, and for the people. Unlike other types of go.vemment,it claims to allow the people themselves to rule, to make the decisions that govern their lives, and "all reasonable people, when they speak of democracy, mean a system in which collective deci-SIO~S,i.e., the decisionswhich affect the whole community are taken by all mterested parties" (Bobbio 1976, p. 111).They are to de~ide their own destmy through their participation in the political process.
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Although democracy in the abstract has few detractors, there is no unanimityof opinion on exactly which forms of political participation are essentialfor democracy or precisely which political institutions best allow the demosto have a say in the governmental process. Richard Fagen (1986, p. 258)believes that there must be effective participation by individuals and groups in the decisions that most affect their lives, a system of accountability such that leaders and officials can be monitored and changed if necessary, and political equality so that all have an equal opportunityto participate in the political process.
Upon closer examination, one finds not one, but several visions of democracy.' These include representative democracy as practiced in Western nations, people's democracy as practiced in many MarxistLeninist states, and direct or participatory democracy as practiced by youngstudents and workers in Paris in 1968 and by the people of Prague in the springof 1968. There is also growing interest in grass-roots democracy,especially as manifest in the worker self-management and neighborhoodcontrol movements. But as different types of democracy proliferate, agreementon what is essential to democracy is more difficult to achieve. Thus,groups that hold one form particularly dear are often loath to admit that other forms might also tap other dimensions of democracy.
InNorth America and Western Europe some have been very skepticalofthe kind or degree of democracy allowed by governmental structures that are not identical to their own. Thus many believed that Nicaragua, becauseit was guided by a party that considered itself socialist, could not possiblyharbor democracy (see U.S. Dept. of State 1987).Socialists have been equally critical of Western-style representative democracy. Lenin (1971, pp.295-296), for instance, argued that the real essenceofbourgeois parliamentarianism was "to decide once every few years which member ofthe ruling class is to repress and crush the people through parliament." Accordingly,he and many Marxists believed that elections and formal parliamentary institutions did not guarantee democracy either. Rather, theybelieved such formal institutions must be transformed into working bodies-like Marx's original vision of the Paris Commune of 1871 or the originallocal soviets in 1917-that allowed the people to have a direct say in the making of policy (ibid., pp. 296-2r:n; see also Marx 1960, lr:n8).
As we examine what democracy means, it may be possible to find somesimilarities in the ways in which democracy is conceived and practicedin socialist and capitalist states. Like John Locke, Marx did not like govemmentand planted the idea-which Lenin developed-that the state apparatus should disappear ("wither away" in Lenin's words). Like Jefferson,he saw government as a necessary evil to be endured only in a transitional stage of socialism while the material bases of class differentiationwere eliminated. As the polity moved to a more advanced stage of socialism(communism) it would no longer be necessary to have a government and the people would rule directly. Indeed, he thought he saw the seed; of such rule when he observed the popular assemblies in the Paris Commune in 1871.
Both Marx and Jefferson trusted the people and thought that they would rule wisely and justly under the right conditions. Neither thought that rule should be far removed from the people, and both believed the interests and opinion ofthe majority should be the final arbiter. Although their modem-day discipleshave often found themselves in opposition, Marxand Jefferson shared a similar view of human nature and democracy, if not govemment as well.Like the French thinker Jean-Jacques Rousseau, both men saw an inherent goodness in all human beings. This led them to place their faith in the people and their inherent ability to control their affairs. They did not think that others should be forever ordained to govern for them. Responding to Rousseau's introductory remarks in The Social Contract, that while born free people are everywhere in chains, Marx ends the Communist Manifesto with his now-famous observation that the proletariat has a world to win and nothing to lose but its chains. Nor did Jefferson-who thought rebellion every twenty years or so was salutary to the body politic-believe that the freedom of the people should be usurped by an elite.' As he put it shortly before he died in the surnmer of 1826, "the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred ready to ride them ... " (in Padover 1956,p. 344).
Jefferson hated monarchy and aristocracy and believed in the people: "Mymost earnest wishisto see the republican element of popular control pushed to the maximum of its practicable exercise." Only then could government be "pure and perpetual." The writer of the Declaration of Independence thought government should be minimal and always under the control of the people. Although he accepted representative government (as contrasted to direct rule by the people) as a necessity, because he believed it was not possible to have direct government in entities that were much larger than New England townships, he thought that such gove.rningshould be by the citizens "acting directly and personally, accordmg to rules established by the majority." Further, the degree of rule by the people should be judged in proportion to the "direct action of its citizens," and the next best thing to pure democracy is where people in branches of government "are chosen by the people more or less directly" (in Padover 1939, p. 39).
.~~one po~t Jefferson went so far as to propose a ward system for Virginia, wherein everyone could be "an acting member of the cornmon government, transacting inperson a great portion of its rights and duties" (inLobel 1988,p. 824). In thattradition, many nineteenth-century Americanradicalsrejected the whole system of representative government and arguedthat laws should be passed by referendum. They believed that the populationshould participate directly in the governmental decisionmakingprocess(ibid.),
The origins of this pure view of democracy extend back through Rousseau to classical Greece where it was assumed that all qualified individualswould not only vote but would directly engage in government through selection by lot or through voluntary participation. Initially, however,the enfranchised demos was a very select group comprised of men who were large landowners or had other means of wealth that allowedthem the time to pursue the affairs of state (all women, slaves, and those of lesser means were excluded). When democracy was reborn and developed after the American Revolution, the categories and numbers of those so enfranchised were gradually widened. As European systemswere reformed to include more political participants, the idea of sometype of rule by the people gained legitimacy and wider acceptance. Graduallyits forms (though not necessarily its radical essence) spread to moredistantparts of Europe and Latin America in the nineteenth century. Bythe second half of the twentieth century, the concept of participation in electionsand other democratic enterprises by virtually all the citizens waswidelyaccepted.
Classicalor orthodox theories of democracy are stronglypremised on real popular participation in the governmental process. Commitment to this theory of democracy therefore implies a belief in the desirability and necessityof widespread popular participation. Likewise, the corollary is thatlowlevels of political interest and participation result from inadequacies in the structures or opportunities for participation that exist in a particularpolity and not from any inherent inadequacies in the people themselves(see Osbun 1985, p. 29). Classical democratic thinkers like Rousseau(as well as Jefferson) are therefore seen as theorists par excellenceofparticipation as an integral part of democracy. They also hold that equalityand economic independence are the minimum conditions necessary for such democratic participation. For thinkers like Rousseau and John Stuart Mill, "participation has far wider functions and is central to the establishment and maintenance of the democratic polity" (Pateman 1970, p. 20) .
This vision of democracy runs through American history and was manifestin populist leaders like Andrew Jackson and in populist movements.It also can be seen in the widening of the voting franchise and in the institutionalization of and recourse to initiative, referendum, and recallthat blossomed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (see Goodwyn 1976 , Salvatore 1982 , Hahn 1983 But there is another strain of democracy that emerged in the West. In the United States, the writers of The Federalist Papers did not think that direct participation of the mass of the people in government was alwayspossible or desirable. Rather they believed that the people should be represented by those who understood the true needs of the republic (those with wealth and/or position). James Madison did not even think that representatives had to be tied directly to the interests of the electorate (Lobel 1988, pp. 828-829).
When arguing for strengthening the federal government, Alexander Hamilton (The Federalist Papers, Federalist 35, 1952)is even more clear: "The actual representation of all classes of the people by persons of each class,is altogether visionary." Hamilton further assumed a commonality of interest between all those who labored in a particular sector of society regardless of their particular wealth. To his way of thinking, the poorest tenant and wealthiest landlord had a common interest (Lobel 1988, pp. 828-829). As suggested elsewhere in The Federalist Papers, there have been those who did not think direct democracy wasnecessary and further believed that chosen representatives (who might come from the wellheeled) could represent the interests of all. Democracy was thus equated with representative government. And after 1787-1788, many held that "democracy meant not government by and of the people, but simply representative government" (ibid., p. 830).
On the other hand, there was considerable concern that the new more centralized constitutional structure of the United States govern: ment would remove power from the hands of the people. The Federalist Papers were in large part written to calm such popular fears. The author of F~deralist 57 (The Federalist Papers 1952, pp. 176-179) spends a considerable amount of time answering the charge that the leadership of this new government "willbe taken from that classof citizens which will have least sympathy with the mass of the people, and be most likely to aim at an ambitious sacrifice of the many to the aggrandizement of the few." Federalist 55 (The Federalist Papers 1952, p. 172) also attempts to refute the charge that the House of Representatives "willbe taken from the class of citizens which will sympathize least with the feelings of the massesofthe people, and be most likely to aim at a permanent elevation of the fewon the depression of the many." John Adams wanted forms of governmentthat stressed avoiding the excesses of pure or direct democracy(Cronin1989, p. 15). The constitutional structure provided the framework for a system of indirect democracy and minimized the tradition of direct democracy that was as old as the English settlements in North America(ibid., p. 1). Popular concerns about such exclusionary visions of democracydid not, however, stop the constitutional structure from being implementedin 1789. This set in motion an emphasis on indirect forms of democracyand a deemphasis on popular participation. Overtime this has evolvedinto a system where there is less and less popular participation.
In a current version of Hamilton's thinking, George Willargued that the "people are not supposed to govern; they are not supposed to decide issues.They are supposed to decide who will decide" (in ibid., p. 21). But evenparticipation in elections (deciding who will decide) is declining. In recent local elections in the United States, an average of fewer than 20 percentof those registered voted. In the presidential election of 1984, only 53 percent of the eligible voters participated. In the 1988 election the figurewas reduced to 50 percent, meaning that some 26 percent of the eligibleelectorate in the United States chose the president. Only 36 percentof the electorate voted in the 1990 midterm election. This evolutionhas prompted many writers 10 be critical of what is currently termed democracyin the United States and to suggest that it is far from majoritarianrule (Parenti 1983).
In hisrecent article "America as a Model for the World? A Skeptical View,"Ted Robert Gurr (1991,p. 665) notes that "empowered political minoritiescan block concerted action" on major policy issues such as medicalcare and social services for those in need. In America: What Went Wrong? Donald Barlett and James B. Steele (1992, p. ix) note how the concentration of wealth and power has derailed American democracy. They observe that the "wage and salary structure of American business, encouraged by federal tax policies, is pushing the nation toward a twoclasssociety.The top 4 percent make as much as the bottom half of U.S. workers."Such trends at least suggest that some care should be taken in holding up this form of democracy as a perfect model that should be emulatedat all cost by developing nations like Nicaragua. Indeed Greider (1992) Another revisionist theonst even suggested that Iimited participation and apathy have a positive function because they cushion the shock of disagreement, adjustment, and change." _ . These writers were expressing unease with that manifestation of the beliefs of the masses that Rousseau (1952, esp. book 2) termed the popular will(yolonte populaire), which is sometimes equated with unreflective or unenlightened public opinion. It is assumed that there IS also a general will ivolonte general) that represents a (more enlightened and) more informed common interest. "The general will alone can direct the State according to the object for which it was instituted, i.e., the common good" (ibid., p. 395). And, "what makes the will general is less the number of votes than the common interest among them" (ibid., p. 397). The democratic revisionists believed that different forms of indirect, representative democracy could express the interest of the people (represent their general interest) as well as or better than direct democracy. But there is more to Rousseau's thinking. He stipulates that the will is only general if it is the willof the entire body of the people, while it is not when it is only the will of a part of it. And further, "there is often a great deal of difference between the will of all and the general will; the latter considers only the common interest, while the former takes private interest into account, and it is no more than a sum of particular wills ... " (ibid., p. 396). Thus many of the democratic revisionists assume that a class of representatives may be able to ascertain the general will for the people even though the government itself may not precisely be of the people. That is, a group not of the people can decide for the people.
The idea of a small group deciding for the many is not limited to revisionist theorists of Western democracy. This concept has perhaps its most perfect articulation in Lenin's conception of the vanguard party as that entity that best understands the needs of the majority (the working class in the modem, increasingly industrialized world) and is therefore most competent to implement policy that benefits it. The theoretical underpinning of the Leninist party is premised on the assumption that the vanguard can know the general will of the people. With the revisionist thinkers in the West, little attempt is made to distinguish between a general~ill that-no m~tter how hard to know-e-considers only the common interest and a WIllof all that is no more than a sum of particular wills (ibid.).
One is here reminded of the work of Robert Systemsthat do not achieve such education, popular deliberation, and involvementdo not, we believe, realize their full potential and therefore couldbe considered singularly ill-suited as models of democratic government. The bureaucratized socialism of Eastern Europe-though it did provide education-afforded little popular deliberation and less meaningfulparticipation. In the United States, there is much popular deliberation,but the quality of education often diminishes its effectiveness. Over the past few decades, there has been less and less participation in most fonns of governance, while economic and political power has become L more and more concentrated. Gurr (1991, p. 666) has noted that policymaking in the United States has not made for the most egabtanan In contrast to the concentration of wealth and influence and declining participation in the United States, classical or full democracy considers participation essential. Moreover, democracy that is participatory is founded on two complementary notions: "that people are inherently capable of understanding their problems and expressing themselves about these problems and their solutions" and that "real solutions to problems require the fullest participation of the people in these solutions, with the development of freedom from dependency on authorities and experts" (Oppenheimer 1971, p. 277). The idea is to create a polity in which everyone will participate to the fullest in decisions that concern their everyday or long-range affairs. The process of decisionmaking, therefore, isas important as the actual irrunediate decision made.
Thus one is led to ask the more difficult questions of if and where adequate models of full democracy exist. As he explored this question alongthe way to the formulation of a new democratic theory, Megill (1970, p. 44) observed that, in different ways, the liberal democrats in the West and the Stalinists in Eastern Europe have each "diverted democracy from its basic tradition of rule by the people." In the socialist countries, the people have been replaced by the party, which isin tum controlled by the party organization (ibid.). Leninist and therefore Communist views of democracy flow from the model of the Marxist-Leninist Party that developed in Russia and the relation of the party to the society. This party was successfulin seizing power,but it failed as an instrument for the thoroughgoing democratization of society, particularly as it developed under Stalin's rule (ibid., p. 43).This is ironic because, from his earliest writings, ".Marxwas committed t? the idea of direct democracy. His early concepuon of such democ~acy mvolved a Rousseauesque critique of the principles of representation ... " and he held the view that "true democracy .. In Marx's mind, the Commune-which was more advanced than the communes that developed in the Middle Ages and was in part inspired by the first French Commune of 1792 (which Jefferson championed)-was the first glimpse of how democracy might work in a socialist society. It was formed by municipal councillors who were chosen by universal suffrage in each ward and were "responsible and revokable at short terms." The majority were working people or their acknowledged representatives. The Commune itself was to be "a working, not a parliamentary body, executive and legislative at the same time" (ibid., p. 632). And (ibid., p. 633)
In a rough sketch of national organization which the Commune had no time to develop, it states clearly that the Commune was to be the political formof even the smallest hamlet, and that in the ruraldistricts the standing army was to be replaced by a national militia, with an extremely shortterm of service. The ruralcommunes of every districtwere to administer their common affairs by an assembly of delegates in the central town, and these district assemblies were again to send deputies to the National Delegation in Paris. each delegate to be at any time revocable and bound by the mandat imperatit( formal instructions) of his constituents. The few but important functions which still would remain for a central government ... were to be discharged by Communal, and therefore strictly responsible agents. The unity of the nation was not to be broken, but, on the contrary. to be organized by the Communal Constitution ....
The people would decide most issues directly at the commune level and would send their direct, recallable representatives to provincial and national assemblies that would in turn decide those issues that could not be handled at the local level. The legitimate functions of govemment were to be restored to the responsible agents of society, the common people. This system would be very different from old representative institutions, where every three or six years it was decided "which member of the ruling class was to misrepresent the people in Parliament" (ibid.). Lest there be any misunderstanding, Marx explicitly states that "nothing could be more foreign to the spirit of the Commune than to supersede universal suffrage by hierarchical investiture" (ibid. In socialist thought, democracy is thus conceived as popular democracy in which-as with Rousseau and Jefferson-the majority rules. According to the Marxist conception of democracy, majority rule means rule by the poorer classes (in those societies that have not~et achieved advanced socialism) since they are by definition the majority (see Kiss 1982, chaps. 1, 2). Some analysts go on to say that democracy is class determined and thus does not exist if the popular classes (where there are still classes) do not rule (ibid., pp. 11-12). But others, who followed Lenin's ideas and were influenced by Stalin, did not see democracy as an end in itself. It was a means of achieving social emancipation. Like the socialist revolution, it was a means of achieving liberation (ibid., p. 122). The revolution was to break down the machinery of class domination and allow a dictatorship of the proletariat to rule for the working people while the structure of the new society was developing. Such a class dictatorship was only considered necessary until the old bourgeois state could be replaced by the classless society, at which time the people would rule directly as the state withered away.
According to Lenin, the vanguard party was to lead the people in the socialist revolution and guide the state while the new society was being constructed. But Lenin's ideas very much flowed from the Russian political culture that produced his thought. Hannah Arendt (1958) notes, for instance, that the revolution occurred in a country with a well-established centralized bureaucracy. Russia had a very authoritarian culture, and "it stands to reason that if any aspect of social life can directly affect government it is the experience with authority that men [and women 1have" (H.
Eckstein as cited in Pateman 1970, p. 12). The historic conditions in which the first experiment in socialist rule developed influenced not only Soviet Marxism, but-because of the influence of the Soviet Union-the way in which socialist thought and praxis developed elsewhere. Commenting on the relative lack of democracy in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Mihailo Markovic (1982, pp. 171-173) also notes that the political culture included elements of "Byzantine-Oriental societies" that did little to instill the libertarian values that foster democracy. Rather they added to the authoritarian influences that imprinted the development of Marxism.
The first days of the Russian revolution were exciting and dynamic. Workers' councils or soviets took control of neighborhoods and factories in St. Petersburg, much the same way the people had formed communes in Paris during the first days of the French Revolution of 1792 and the . Paris Commune of 1871. Democracy was alive, direct, and vibrant. The people themselves were exerting their rule. As the revolution raged on and foreignpowers cut off the infant socialist state economically and sent expeditionary forces to overthrow it, conditions were considered to be suchthat more authoritarian measures were needed. Democracy became restricted as the people ruled less and less directly. Lenin, however, believed that democracy could be reinstituted after the revolution was no longer threatened (Medvedev 1975, p. 43) . He held that if "during the transition period from capitalism to socialism there are some restrictions on democracy (and the extent of these restrictions must be gradually reduced), nonetheless with the full victory of socialism all restrictions on politicaldemocracy fall away" (in ibid., p. 31). Indeed, Lenin said, "The victory of socialism is impossible without the realization of democracy" (ibid.).
But for Lenin the structure and the vanguard role of the party were fundamental. In the 1920s there was considerable discussion of how the party would be organized and exactly what relation it would have to the exerciseofpower by other segments of the society. Before he died in 1924, Leninhad already begun to express concern about the role ofbureaucracy. In this context, the question of party organization was central, but by then what had come to be called democratic centralism had been accepted. Ironically,although designed to democratize the functioning ofthe party, in reality it did not allow any real discussion of the issues or contact with the revolutionary movement as manifest in the toiling masses (Megill 1970, p. 43).
After Lenin's death there was even less opportunity for discussion. As Stalin consolidated his power, he came to view any opposition as a hostilebourgeois influence that had to be resisted (Medvedev 1975,p. 44). Thus not only was popular democracy discouraged, but dissent was not tolerated. The heady democracy of the first days of the revolution was increasinglyreplaced by bureaucratic authoritarian party rule. The Left oppositiontried to resist these trends inside the Soviet Union. They were not successfuland, like Leon Trotsky, many were killed.
Although many other socialists objected to Stalinism, they did not objecltothe "paternalistic justification of systematic antidemocratic measuresofsome form" (Cunningham 1987, p. 274). Lenin believed that the CommunistParty was best equipped to know the general willof the people and rule on their behalf. Stalin evidently came to believe that he was best suited to decide important issues in the party. Thus a party bureaucracy that was increasingly dominated by one person began to rule in the name of the people. These decisions were ostensibly made to safeguard if not save the revolution from its internal and external enemies. Practical necessitywas cited as the rationale. In theoretical terms, it was argued that Democracy & Socialism in Sandinista Nicaragua certain tactical decisions were necessary but that their implementation and effectwere temporal. Megill(1970, p. 62) holds that the effects wer~much more far-reaching: they led to a theoretical failure of Stalinism that in tum crippled the democratic Marxist tradition because it failed to ".distinguish between purely tactical considerations-practical considerations, which may be more or less correct at a given moment-and the theoretical development of Marxism."
.. The Hungarian Marxist Georg Lukacs is equally clear on this issue: "In other words: instead of following the true method of Marxism and developing a strategy and tactics from an analysis of events, tactical decisions-right or wrongdecisions-were decisive,and a theory was built on these" (cited in ibid.,p. 62). Lukacs further argues (ibid., p. 55) that
The tremendous historical guilt of Stalinism exists in the fact that not only was scientific development not followed up. but this development went backwards. Stalin hindered just those tendencies which would have been capable of developing Marxism.
As Marxist theory and practice developed in the Soviet Union and those areas of the world that were modeled after it, its democratic and participatory dimensions were generally neglected if not directly subordinated to immediate concerns as defined by the party leadership. In the West, representative democratic institutions became bulwarks against direct and majority participation in government, which in tum laid the basisfor the transformation of these institutions into paternalistic organs of minority rule (Cunningham 1987, P-276). In socialist countries similar processes occurred (ibid., p. 356). The paternalistic vanguardism of the party was substituted for the direct rule of the people that Marx glimpsed in the Paris Commune. Although party congresses and even elections were held in the peoples' democracies, the demos was ruled much more than it ruled. Milovan Djilas (1957, 1962) has suggested that a "new class" of rulers had developed in such societies and that they had usurped popular rule. The state did not wither away and democracy did not develop. Stalin even argued that the state must be strengthened greatly before it could wither away (Bottomore et al. 1983, p. 463). Elaborate rationalizations attempted to show how the people were actually being served because the party was decid~g on their behalf by setting the agenda and limiting the number of candidates for whom the people voted in elections." As had been done by Dahl and other revisionist theorists of democracy in thẽ est,~heory was elaborated to explain how (some) democracy actually did exist in the status quo, even though that reality was lacking when it came to real democracy and democratization. In both instances it seemed it wasmuch easier to change, modify, or reinterpret the theory than it was to change the status quo and actually allow the people to have power.
..
Many who wrote from a Marxist perspective did not realize that there wasa confluence of interests and perspective on the part ofthe hierarchies of both Eastern socialism and Western capitalist democracy. They were both heavilyinvested in the status quo and reluctant to allowany change. As with the bureaucratization of the state and party in Eastern Europe, several scholars have noted that there has been an historical proliferation of bureaucracy and bureaucratic thought in U.S. institutions. Decisions and initiatives for problem solving have come more and more from the center, thus discouraging local participation (see, inter alia, Wiebe 1967, Higgs1987,and Lasch 1919, 1991).The elite in Eastern Europe criticized the economic and political marginalization of the majority in capitalist democracy but would not institute genuinely democratic institutions at home. The establishment in the West would criticize the elitist rule in socialist stateswhile allowing economicand political elites to exerciseincreasinglymorepower at home and the massesto participate lessandless. Neither moved to increase democracy. Both argued that the people were better off in their respective system and insisted theirs was the model to copy.
Despite the poverty of democratic examples in both the capitalist West and socialist East, Nicaragua had set about the process of constructingreal democracy within a socialist state. The Sandinista revolution had rediscoveredNicaragua's popular history and thus its popular consciousness; it had indeed unleashed the power of the masses. Unlike other revolutionary experiences, there was enough understanding among the Sandinistas, members of the popular church, Nicaraguan and internationalist youth, and others involved with the revolutionary process to set up institutional structures that included and channeled mass participation. The masses had not only been mobilized, they had found ways they couldcontinue to express their will. But the reality wascomplex. On the one hand the Sandinista leadership was delighted to see "the people" (whichwashow they conceived the diverse, multiclass popular revolutionary force in Nicaragua) fully mobilized. On the other hand they feared that if they immediately held elections, the formal Western facade of institutional democracy that Somoza and many other traditional Central Americanleaders had manipulated to foreclose real and effective participation might well be the only democracy that would be allowed to develop. The Sandinista leaders were also well acquainted with Leninist thinkingas to the vanguard role of the party and thus felt theyhad a special obligationto prepare the people by ensuring that their politicalconsciousness was developed. The dominant role the party had assumed in the decisionmaking process in Cuba also helped to incline their thinking in more authoritarian directions. Because they also feared the influence of bourgeoiselements inside the country, and in part because they could not totallybreak away from unconscious authoritarian beliefs (which resulted principally from Nicaraguan political history and culture), the Sandinista leadership, as principally manifested in the National Directorate, reserved a substantial amount of power to itself.
In the early 1980s,the creation of West em representative institutions was postponed and direct participation was encouraged. But an authontarian decisionmaking trend was developing inside the party and among those Sandinista leaders who held key governmental posts. These tendencies and the increasing military and economic pressure exerted by the United States worked against the further empowerment of the demos through direct and continued participation. Nor were traditional models of democracy in Eastern Europe or the West helpful in this regard. Subsequent chapters will show how these factors interacted to produce a unique development of democracy within a socialist state. Like the mixed economy in which it developed, both representative and participatory democracy eventually operated side by side under the guidance of the democratic centralism of the FSLN. Indeed, it seems that there was continued competition among Western representative democracy, participatory democracy, and democratic centralism. It remains to be seen if the confluence of these factors actually caused democracy to flower in Sandinista Nicaragua, or if it stifled the construction of what might have been the first full-blown example of direct, participatory Marxist democracy.
Notes

